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1 Allan  Marquand’s  “On  Scientific  Method  in  the  Study  of  Art”  was  presented  to  the
Princeton Philosophical Club on 20 January 1889.1 The essay in its entirety was never
published,  making the transcription of  it  that  follows this  introduction an especially
interesting  historical  document  for  a  number  of  reasons.2 First  of  all,  in  1889  the
discipline of art history in America was still very much in its nascent stages; Marquand
had been appointed to his professorship – the second of its kind in the entire country –
only six  years  earlier  in 1883.3 Thus,  it  is  not  an exaggeration to say that  the ideas
presented in Marquand’s essay were part of the very origin of the discipline of art history
in the United States. Despite what Marquand’s ideas helped set in motion, however, and
despite what his professional identity would soon be, Marquand had not trained to be an
art  historian.  Rather,  as  a  student  he  had  largely  studied  philosophy,  both  as  an
undergraduate under James McCosh – often described as the last great representative of
the Scottish Common Sense tradition – and subsequently during his PhD under none
other than Charles Sanders Peirce.4 What makes Marquand’s “On Scientific Method in the
Study of Art” so interesting and appropriate to discuss and publish in this special issue of
The European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy is that it quite clearly lays bare
Peirce’s influence on Marquand’s thinking and thus reveals the presence of Pragmatist
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ideas at  a crucial  early point in the development of  art  historical  scholarship in the
United States.
2 In what follows, I closely read Marquand’s arguments in “On Scientific Method in the
Study of Art” both in relation to their sources as well as in relation to Marquand’s own
subsequent  scholarship.  To  do  so,  I  organize  my  thoughts  around  the  structure  of
Marquand’s,  examining  the  relationships  between  Marquand  and  his  mentors,
contemporaries, and nemeses as they emerge in the course of his essay. My thesis is that
while Peirce’s writing is the most conspicuous and important inspiration for the essay,
Marquand’s handwritten corrections to the text also reveal a struggle with Peirce’s ideas
that  can  –  especially  in  light  of  Marquand’s  later  writing  –  be  read  to  expose  an
ambivalent  or  potentially  even  critical  attitude  toward  central  aspects  of  Peirce’s
thought. Thus while it is important to understand “On Scientific Method in the Study of
Art” specifically in relation to Peirce, it is also essential to broaden our framework and to
place Marquand’s claims in the essay in relation to both preceding and subsequent art
historical scholarship.5 Doing so helps flesh out which aspects of Marquand’s essay are
clearly indebted to Peirce, which aspects have deeper and more complex historical roots,
and perhaps most importantly, how we might understand “On Scientific Method in the
Study of Art” as foundational for the discipline that partially followed from it. 
⁂
3 Marquand hand-scrawled the surviving manuscript of “On Scientific Method in the Study
of Art” over fifty-five small, loose pages, each no bigger than an A5 sheet of paper. Many
of the pages have extensive corrections and some even have pasted-on additions. All in
all,  the  original  manuscript  reveals  the  signs  of  having  been  edited  repeatedly  and
thoroughly, and considering it remained unpublished during his lifetime, it is safe to say
that Marquand was never completely satisfied with its  claims or conclusions.  Yet,  as
noted at the outset, Marquand did present the essay to the Princeton Philosophical Club
and did publish an abstract of the essay in the Princeton College Bulletin. Passages from the
essay also appeared in another text that Marquand published several years later, titled
“The History of  Art  as  a  University Study,” which was written more for the general
audience of the university community than for academic specialists.6 Thus, even though
Marquand never published “On Scientific Method in the Study of Art,” it is certain that
the ideas presented in the essay played a key role in how Marquand both envisioned and
established art history at Princeton.
4 As the essay’s title suggests, “On Scientific Method in the Study of Art” is very much a
part of the positivistic thinking that by 1889 had long been taking hold within all forms of
scholarship  –  art  history  being no exception.  Much in  keeping with the  research of
Leopold Ranke in history and Auguste Comte in sociology, starting in the 1820s,  Karl
Friedrich von Rumohr and his followers in Berlin developed an approach to art history
that was marked by careful archival research and scrupulous attention to the material
dimensions  of  individual  art  objects.7 Similarly  to  Rumohr’s  writing,  in  his  essay
Marquand advocates an empirical approach, one that, it should be said, also very much
mirrors a broader trend in American historical scholarship of the time.8 In Marquand’s
subsequent  writing  he  put  this  general  method  into  practice  by,  on  the  one  hand,
publishing  transcriptions  of  previously  unknown archival  documents  and by,  on  the
other, focusing his practice of attribution on the detailed material qualities of artworks.
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Just as Rumohr had addressed the question of Giotto’s oeuvre by focusing on the wax
binding agent that he thought was particular to Giotto’s mode of painting, so too did
Marquand write about the glazes used by the Della Robbia, pointing to the particular
qualities of those glazes – gritty versus runny, evenly or unevenly applied, marked by
certain color combinations, etc. – as a grounds for assigning authorship to specific works.
9 While  Marquand  was  not  nearly  as  incredulous  about  existing  attributions  as  was
Rumohr – who was so critical of the attributions of paintings to Giotto in the 1820s that
he whittled them down to a single indubitable object – he is likely best and most broadly
positioned as a connoisseur of his ilk.10 In this respect it is fitting that Marquand not only
maintained a correspondence throughout his professional life with Wilhelm von Bode,
the most prominent inheritor of the Berlin-based school of thought that Rumohr helped
establish, but also dedicated his first book on the Della Robbia to Bode as “The Pioneer of
Robbia Studies.”11 
5 In relation to his mentorship under Peirce, that Marquand practiced such a positivistic
approach  is  certainly  apt;  Peirce  himself  had  advocated  and  developed  a  strictly
“scientific” method of inquiry, and the Pragmatism that he introduced and championed
has  often  been positioned  within  the  larger  history of  positivism.12 Considering  this
commonality, the specific Peircean bent of Marquand’s thinking is important to clarify,
and, in this regard, the general structure of Marquand’s essay is key. Marquand begins
“On  Scientific  Method  in the  Study  of  Art”  by  describing  three  alternatives  to  his
preferred method, namely what he calls the mystical, the metaphysical, and the literary.
This  general  structure  is  deeply  reminiscent  of  Peirce’s  well-known  claims  in  “The
Fixation of Belief” of 1877.13 Therein Peirce also lays out three alternative and flawed
modes of belief in order to differentiate his scientific approach: what he dubs beliefs
based on tenacity,  on authority,  and on a priori principles.  While the terminology of
Marquand’s  essay does not  perfectly mirror Peirce’s,  considering that  Marquand was
studying under Peirce at Johns Hopkins when “The Fixation of Belief” had been recently
published, it is safe to assume that he knew about the essay and only warranted to take
Peirce’s essay as an important model upon which “On Scientific Method in the Study of
Art”  was  based.14 As  we  will  see,  a  close  reading  of  Marquand’s  text  continues  to
substantiate this interpretation.
6 By the mystical approach to art Marquand means the belief that the key to or essence of
visual  art  is  somehow beyond sensuous apprehension,  that  art  requires some special
abilities or faculties to understand. Marquand associates this mode of understanding with
a naïve public and with a “priest-craft” that doles out judgments seemingly based on
authority alone.15 In “The Fixation of Belief” Peirce too used the examples of theology and
religion as examples against which he distinguished his approach, and, like Marquand,
uses the example of a “priesthood” to do so.16 Though specific historical writers who fit
this method are lacking in Marquand’s essay, the mystical method is more than just an
empty straw man for  Marquand to  tear  down.  The  Princeton Department  had quite
literally been founded against the idea that “the word Art implies a mystery, which can
be penetrated by only a few intellects,”17 or so that is what two of its earliest advocates
stated in one of their most public attempts to establish the professorship that Marquand
was to occupy. Moreover, as Marquand is sure to point out in his essay, part of why he is
so inimical to the so-called mystical method is because it stands opposed to “anything
like consensus of thinking minds.”18 With this last phrase Marquand further displays his
education both under Peirce and within the tradition of Common Sense philosophy more
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generally. As is well known, both Peirce and the Scottish Common Sense philosophers
defended the central role of consensus in the construction of knowledge, a position that
is  often connected to the New England tradition of  town-hall  meetings and that  has
continued to cause much debate among later Pragmatist thinkers.19 While we cannot be
certain where Marquand would have positioned himself within these subsequent debates,
his appeal to a “consensus of thinking minds” is nonetheless important in understanding
how he adapted his philosophical training to art historical purposes.
7 Marquand next  distinguishes  this  mystical  approach to  art  from what  he  terms  the
metaphysical method, a distinction that roughly parallels Peirce’s distinction between
beliefs based on authority and those based on the a priori. “On Scientific Method in the
Study of Art” understandably associates the metaphysical approach most heavily with the
work of Hegel, but Marquand does also gesture toward forms of idealism more generally.
On Marquand’s view, the chief strength of Hegel’s metaphysical method is also its main
weakness: it functions through analytic distinctions and definitions, for instance it
defines works of art in relation to beauty and then defines beauty itself in relation to
further terms. Marquand points out that Hegel’s metaphysics is an improvement over the
so-called mystical method in that it subjects itself to the public test of reason and thereby
aims to “make our ideas clear,” a turn of phrase that Peirce used to title one of his best-
known essays from the period and one whose reappearance within Marquand’s text is
hard to see as coincidental.20 Despite this noble goal,  however, the price paid for the
metaphysical approach is that Hegel’s system focuses more on theoretical definitions and
their interrelation than on what Marquand claims to be the actual object of art historical
study: “material things.”21 Here Marquand’s insistence that the study of art be first and
foremost empirical and realist parallels one of the most lasting legacies of 19th-century
“science,” both the naïve and sophisticated. 
8 Whether or not Marquand’s own empiricism was as innovative and as complex as Peirce’s
is an open question. Marquand’s previous research in philosophy does assure that he was
well  aware  of  the  long-standing  questions  over  the  liabilities  surrounding  empirical
inferences.  Indeed,  what  seems  to  be  the  published  introduction  to  his  now-lost
dissertation is a sophisticated discussion of the ancient debates between the Skeptics,
Stoics,  and Epicureans about the limits and powers of induction.22 Combined with his
training under Peirce and McCosh, it is certain that Marquand was not philosophically
naïve. Moreover, if we ourselves approach Della Robbia sculpture through the lens of
Marquand’s period and remember the importance of statistics both for the Darwinian
revolution and for Peirce himself, the artistic production of the Della Robbia becomes a
fitting problem to tackle. Having been created by generations of artists and being made
up of over a thousand objects, Robbia ware presents itself as ripe for statistical reasoning.
23 Though  Marquand  did  not  explicitly  publish  statistical  tabulations  of  visual
characteristics in his study of the Della Robbia, that he did so in other publications shows
that he was certainly capable of this type of work and suggests that some implicit form of
probabilistic reasoning could even be behind his attributions.24
9 Much  in  keeping  with  these  interdisciplinary  currents,  Marquand’s  practice  of
connoisseurship was also heavily based on applying the morphological techniques of the
natural sciences to the task of delimiting the oeuvres of individual artists, a practice that
is  criticized as  often as  it  is  praised by art  historians today.25 Like his  more famous
contemporary Giovanni Morelli, Marquand often gauged the authorship of individual art
objects by how well the specific features of one of their representational details matched
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the typological features of that same representational detail in an artist’s larger oeuvre.26
Whereas Morelli  practiced this method by comparing the depicted ears and hands in
paintings attributed to Renaissance masters like Botticelli,  Marquand often did so by
comparing the eyes found across sculptures attributed to the Della Robbia.27 As critics of
this approach are prone to point out, in its heavy focus on mere observables, Morellian
connoisseurship  inches  dangerously  close  to  the  hyperbolic  reduction  of  scientific
hypotheses  to  observation alone.  The problems with such an approach for  historical
scholarship are, of course, well known, if not obvious. For one, historical research seeks
to understand something that is by definition beyond observation – the past – and thus
the  notion  that  historical  hypotheses  must  be  verified  through observation  alone  is
clearly overstated. Because Peirce himself made similar criticisms of Comte’s positivist
method and Marquand did not solely base his attributions on the visual qualities of art
objects, one can justifiably believe that Marquand was similarly savvy as to the limits of
observation.28 Moreover, unlike Morelli, Marquand was not prone to categorical assertion
and  openly  acknowledged  that  his  connoisseurial  claims  were  only  probable,  never
certain.29 
10 The third and final critique that Marquand puts forward in what amounts to his initial
negative  definition  of  his  own  approach  is  of  what  he  calls  the  literary  method,  a
distinction  that  Peirce  himself  also  used.30 Figures  as  diverse  as  Giorgio  Vasari  and
Hippolyte Taine serve as Marquand’s representatives of this school of thought, whose
method he associates with a focus on expression. On Marquand’s view, even though there
are many  parallels  between  visual  art  and  literature,  much  like  the  metaphysical
approach, the literary method does not place enough emphasis on “the observation of
things.”31 The specificity of visual art, in other words, is largely lost when it is approached
as if it were a work of literature, and if the study of visual art is to reach its maximum
potential,  it  should rely  on  methods  that  allow  its  practitioners  to  analyze  and
understand art objects on their own terms. The validity of this final critique is perhaps
less historically interesting than its  likely intended object  of  ridicule:  the only other
competing model of art historical education and research in the United States at the time.
In 1874, Charles Eliot Norton was appointed Professor of Fine Arts as Connected with
Literature at Harvard and, by 1889, had already done much to establish art history in the
US.32 Considering  Norton’s  title,  the  fact  that  he  was  a  scholar  of  Dante,  and  that
Marquand explicitly mentions Norton’s mentor, John Ruskin, by name, the direction of
Marquand’s third and final critique would have been hard for readers of the time to miss.
Norton’s classes were popular at Harvard and his fame was so intense during his lifetime
that his friend and fellow Harvard professor William James believed that Norton – rather
than himself – would be remembered as one of the greatest voices of his generation.33
While James’s judgment has not stood the test of time and Norton has sunk into historical
obscurity, Norton’s popularity and fame would have certainly made him an evident and
important  alternative  for  Marquand  to  distinguish  himself  against.  Moreover,
considering Norton’s own critical attitude toward James’s Pragmatism and Marquand’s
proximity to that approach thanks to his education under Peirce, it seems only fitting
that Marquand would have contrasted his form of art history to that of Norton.34 
11 In the face of these various “non-scientific” methods, Marquand defines his approach
positively by first offering a broad and rough definition of visual art, an effort that speaks
at once to the nascent state of the discipline as well as to his philosophical education in
general. Marquand limits his study of “art” to those objects that are designed by man to
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“appeal to us through impressions made upon the eye” and to objects that “arouse the
higher forms of consciousness:  memory,  understanding,  imagination,  emotion,  will.”35
Here we can see that even though Marquand’s “scientific” approach is heavily empirical
and deeply critical of philosophical idealism, he recognizes that any study of art that
ignores the broad range of human mental activity that art objects often stimulate will be
incomplete. Perhaps more surprisingly, despite Marquand’s firm empirical commitments,
at scattered points in the essay Marquand’s claims even edge toward some of Peirce’s
grand  metaphysical  speculations:  for  instance  when  Marquand  introduces  the  very
notion of art in relation to pure chaos as well as when he speaks of alternate universes of
color  “of  which  we  have  never  dreamed.”36 In  his  later  art  historical  scholarship,
however, Marquand does not pursue these ideas and does not discuss in any developed
way the “higher forms of consciousness” or alternative universes that he appeals to here.
Indeed, taken together, Marquand’s subsequent publications amount to a multivolume
catalogue raisonné of the Della Robbia workshop, an impressive accomplishment in terms
of its encyclopedic aims and reach but one that does not even gesture toward the grand
schemes mentioned in this early essay. 
12 In this respect it should be pointed out that however indebted “On Scientific Method in
the Study of  Art”  is  to  Peirce,  it  is  hard to  see  Marquand’s  mature  writing as  fully
Peircean.  For  one,  Marquand’s  lack  of  subsequent  theorizing  lends  credence  to  the
characterization of him by one of his friends and colleagues as having a “profoundly anti-
metaphysical nature,” a characterization that Marquand himself seems to have at least
indirectly  courted.37 Not  only  does  Marquand  explicitly  oppose  his  method  to
metaphysics in this early essay,  but the very reason why he ended up teaching art’s
empirical  history at  Princeton was because he refused – or perhaps more accurately
adapted to his interests – James McCosh’s initial suggestion to teach the philosophy of
art.38 Much in keeping with such preferences, when faced with philosophical questions
from his old mentor not long after making his disciplinary transition, Marquand resisted
taking up such issues and described himself as “an outsider in philosophical matters.”39
Under  such  descriptions,  Marquand’s  scholarship  is  surely  closer  to  that  of  high
positivists, for whom the words “philosophy” and “metaphysics” are often opposed to
“science,” rather than to that of Peirce, for whom such an opposition was specious at
best. Indeed, Peirce himself once said: “Find a scientific man who proposes to get along
without any metaphysics […] and you have found one whose doctrines are thoroughly
vitiated by the crude and uncriticized metaphysics with which they are packed.”40 
13 Further  into  “On  Scientific  Method  in  the  Study  of  Art”  we  see  just  how  radically
committed Marquand was to applying rigorously “scientific” methods to his object of
analysis, to describing art, as Peirce might have said, “independent of the vagaries of me
and you.”41 In analyzing works of art in terms of their color, he turns immediately to
mathematics, specifically to the binomial equation, and deduces from it that there are an
infinite  number  of  complementary  colors.42 Perhaps  what  is  most  interesting  about
Marquand’s claim is not whether or not it is correct – many questions about color still
persist  today – but rather how it  further suggests that his training in Peircean logic
exerted a strong hold upon him.43 Marquand’s algebraic argument is, after all, much more
akin to his earlier work with Peirce on a logical machine than to average art historical
research of the time.44 Though Marquand’s mathematical tack here is neither without
precedent nor without affinity to later scholarship, a similar appeal would likely come
across  as  more  baffling  than  intriguing  to  art  historians  today.  This  fact  may  be
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lamentable; however, it testifies at once to the distance between Marquand’s approach
and  contemporary  scholarship  as  well  as  to  the  divide  between  the  Natur-  and 
Geisteswissenschaften that has become especially evident in the scholarship of more recent
generations.45
14 Much  in  keeping  with  Marquand’s  strong  “scientific”  commitments,  it  comes  as  no
surprise  that  Marquand also  believed that  the Darwinian model  of  evolution –  what
Peirce called the application of statistics to biology – would be equally applicable to the
study of visual art.46 Though today we are justified in criticizing Marquand’s championing
of a Darwinian model as overly optimistic, it is important to recognize that Marquand’s
praise occurred for a reason.  When Marquand penned this essay in the late 1880s,  a
revolutionary chronological technique was being developed by the British archaeologist
William  Matthew  Flinders  Petrie  that  owed  much  to  Darwinian  thinking.  Known  as
sequence analysis, in this technique Flinders Petrie arranged pottery sherds from various
archaeological sites into series based on their formal features.  He then inferred from
these sequences of objects relative,  rather than absolute,  chronologies and correlated
those chronologies  with the various stratigraphic layers  in which those objects  were
discovered.47 Given the lack of alternative evidence available at the time, Flinders Petrie’s
technique  was  especially  powerful.  And  while  it  was  neither  exact  nor  infallible,
subsequent studies that have relied on more modern techniques – like radiocarbon dating
– have confirmed its usefulness.48 When placed in this historical context, we can well
understand Marquand’s strong commitment to the formal analysis of art objects. 
15 Interestingly, however, and not unimportant, the revisions in the handwritten draft of
“On Scientific  Method in the Study of  Art” reveal  that  Marquand conceptualized his
overstated  appeal  to  Darwin  specifically  in  relation  to  some  of  Peirce’s  claims.  In
considering  which  method  would  be  best  for  studying  visual  art  “scientifically,”
Marquand refers to Peirce’s distinctive tripartite scheme of “deduction, induction, and
hypothesis.”49 Rather than develop this line of reasoning further, however, Marquand
subsequently crossed this explicit reference to Peirce out of his essay. The reasons for
Marquand’s  change  of  heart  are  likely  lost  to  history;  however,  Peirce’s  notion  of
“hypothesis” was a distinctive one. In fact, Peirce later tried to capture the particularity
of his term “hypothesis” by renaming it “abduction,” by which he meant “the process of
forming explanatory hypotheses,” “all the operations by which theories and conceptions
are engendered.”50 Peirce was even confident enough in his theory of abduction that he
dubbed it the experimental mode of inference that lay behind his philosophy in general –
his Pragmatism.51 While the validity of such a claim is disputable and Peirce’s notion of
abduction is  controversial,  the continued interest  in his  writing,  not  to mention the
growth of neo-Pragmatist thinking across disciplines today, makes Marquand’s passing
and excised reference to Peirce’s  term for theoretical  invention especially intriguing.
Combined with the early place of “On Scientific Method in the Study of Art” within the
history of art history, we might wonder what art historiography would look like today if
Marquand had embraced Peirce’s conceptualization of the role of theory in science – let
alone Peirce’s vast metaphysics in general. 
16 In closing, such speculation is especially fitting because most art historians today would
likely – at least at first glance – understand Peirce’s and Marquand’s writing as deeply
antithetical.  Though much of  this  essay  has  been dedicated  to  showing  why such  a
judgment  is  flawed,  the  fact  is  that  the  recent  art  historical  rediscovery  of  Peirce’s
scholarship  was  motivated  not  by  the  confidence  in  inductive  inference  found  in
Reading Allan Marquand’s “On Scientific Method in the Study of Art”
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, VIII-2 | 2016
7
Marquand’s catalogues but rather by a skepticism and doubt concerning the discipline’s
possession of a sufficiently robust grasp of its own philosophical foundations. Indeed, art
historians today most often associate Peirce’s name with the discipline’s semiotic turn in
the  1980s  and  ’90s,  a  turn  that  largely  interpreted  Peirce’s  writing  as  an  ally  of
deconstructive ends.52 Thus it would seem that if Marquand had more fully embraced
Peirce’s project and developed his connoisseurship on a more explicitly theoretical basis,
the “crisis of the discipline” that Henri Zerner and Hans Belting announced in the 1980s
would likely have confronted vastly different art historical precedents.53 Moreover, now
that we stand on the other side of that crisis and have the privilege of hindsight, it seems
clear that the largely negative thrust of art history’s deconstructive moment was only
partially sufficient. Clearly what is still needed is a working out in a positive manner of
new art historical principles upon which the fundamental practices of the discipline –
practices like Marquand’s connoisseurship – can be based. That art historians continue to
struggle with such a task is itself a testament to the valuable work that Marquand himself
might have done if he had further developed the Peircean dimension of his early thought,
if  “On  Scientific  Method  in  the  Study  of  Art”  had  not  remained  an  unpublished,
handwritten essay but rather had become a true monograph on the “scientific method”
behind Marquand’s – and thus our – history of art.54 
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NOTES
1. The original manuscript is housed in the Allan Marquand Papers, Box 10, Folder 22, Firestone
Library, Princeton University. For a published abstract of the paper, see Marquand (1889: 56-7). 
2. Allan Marquand (2016: 290-8).
3. For a more thorough contextual discussion of Marquand’s appointment,  see Marilyn Lavin
1983. For an additional contextualization of Marquand’s appointment, see Betsy Rosasco 1996.
4. On McCosh, see Hoeveler 1981. On Marquand’s work with Peirce, see Nathan Houser (1989: xix-
lxx); Max Fisch (1986; esp. 230-1).
5. For a helpful  overview of these developments,  see Kleinbauer 1971.  For perhaps the best-
known  discussion  of  the  place  of  American  scholarship  within  longer-term  disciplinary
developments, see Panofsky 1953. 
6. Marquand 1892.
7. Rumohr’s  most  extensive  statement  of  his  views  is  found  in  his  Italienische  Forschungen
(1827-31). For a contextual discussion of Rumohr’s work, see Enrica Yvonne Dilk 2000. For a brief
but recent introductory overview of the emergence of “scientific” approaches to art history in
the German tradition see, Matthew Rampley (2013; esp. 18-21). 
8. For an extensive discussion of this development, see Peter Novack 1988. 
9. For an example of Marquand’s use of differences in the material qualities glazes as a ground
for attribution, see Marquand 1912.
10. Rumohr’s discussion of Giotto is found in his Italienische Forschungen. For a translation of this
chapter, see Rumohr 1988.
11. Marquand 1912. The extant letters from Marquand to Bode begin in 1883 and end in 1921.
They are housed in the Nachlass Wilhelm von Bode in the Zentralarchiv of the Staatliche Museen
zu  Berlin.  Bode’s  letters  to  Marquand  are  housed  in  the  Allan  Marquand  Papers,  Princeton
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University Library, (Box 11, Folder 46). For a discussion of Rumohr’s so-called “Berlin School,”
see Gabriele Bickendorf (2007: 46-61). For a discussion of Bode in particular, see Tilmann von
Stockhausen (2007: 141-51).
12. For instance, Leszek Kolakowski 1968.
13. Charles Sanders Peirce (1992 [1877]: 109-23).
14. Marquand earned his PhD from Johns Hopkins in 1880 and he took multiple courses with
Peirce while there, including his general course in logic, his course in medieval logic, and two
courses  in  advanced  logic.  Marquand also  gave  papers  at  the  Metaphysical  Club  that  Peirce
founded at Hopkins in 1879. See, Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen & Jean-Marie Chevalier 2014.
15. Marquand (2016: 290).
16. Peirce (1992 [1877]: 117).
17. William C. Prime & George B. McClellan (1882: 15-6).
18. Marquand (2016: 290).
19. For an example of a scholar who connects the consensus theory of truth to New England town
meetings, see Richard Posner 2003. For debates among current Pragmatist philosophers about
the consensus theory of truth, see, for instance, Cheryl Misak’s criticisms of Richard Rorty in her,
Truth, Politics, Morality: Pragmatism and Deliberation (1999).
20. Marquand (2016: 292). Charles Sanders Peirce (1992 [1878]: 124-41).
21. Marquand (2016: 292).
22. Marquand 1883a.
23. For  an example  of  the large number of  objects  that  were attributed to  the della  Robbia
workshop during Marquand’s lifetime, see Maud Cruttwell 1902.
24. For an example of Marquand’s use of statistics to analyze the style of visual art objects, see
Marquand (1894: 521-32).
25. For a critical take on this approach, see Karen Lang (2006; esp. 179-98). For a more affirmative
take, see Richard Wollheim 1974.
26. On  Morrelli  in  general,  see  Carol  Gibson-Wood  1988.  On  Morelli’s  relation  to  inductive
reasoning see, Carlo Ginzburg 1980. On this point it should be noted that Morelli’s method owed
much to the morphological techniques of Louis Agassiz, whose work was also greatly admired by
Peirce. For Morelli’s debt to Agassiz, see Margaret Olin 2012; Richard Pau 1993.
27. For a discussion of Marquand’s approach and lasting contribution to Della Robbia scholarship
see, Marietta Cambareri (2014: 13-21). I would like to thank Rachel Boyd for this reference.
28. For Peirce’s criticisms of Comte’s positivism see, Peirce 1904.
29. For Marquand’s acknowledgement of his fallibilism, see Marquand (1922: vii). Marquand also
strongly criticized Josef Strygowski for having too much confidence in his categorical  claims
about the Middle Eastern origins of early Christian art. See Marquand 1910.
30. A clear instance of this is found in Peirce’s essay “What Pragmatism is,” Collected Papers of
Charles Sanders Peirce, 5.414. I would like to take this opportunity to thank Tullio Viola for this
reference especially and for other references found in this essay as well.
31. Marquand (2016: 293).
32. For the most comprehensive account of Norton’s appointment and life,  see James Turner
1999. Despite their differences, like Marquand, Norton owed much to Scottish Common Sense
philosophy. For this connection see, Linda Dowling 2007. On this point it should also be noted
that, like Marquand, Norton himself published transcriptions of unpublished primary sources in
his books. See Norton 1880. 
33. For James’s comment about Norton, see William James to Alice James, 23 August 1891, in
James (1961: 137). James Turner notes in his biography of Norton that at the height of his fame,
close to a third of the Harvard undergraduate student body – some 451 students – attended his
course “Fine Arts 3.” See Turner (1999: 375).
34. Norton (1913: 412).
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35. Marquand (2016: 294).
36. Marquand (2016: 298). For instance, one might compare Marquand’s ideas here to those of
Peirce as expressed in his “A Guess at the Riddle,” The Essential Peirce, vol. 1, 245-79.
37. Quoted in Rosasco (1996: n.164, 49).
38. Marquand’s decision to teach art history is recounted in both Lavin’s 1983 and Rosasco 1996. 
39. Quoted in Ketner (1984: 208).
40. Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce,  ed. Hartshorne, Weiss, and Burks, Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1931-58, 1: 129.
41. Peirce (1992: 52).
42. Marquand (2016: 298).
43. For a lucid discussion of various problems with our understanding of color that persist today
see, Alva Noë (2004: 123-61). For a representative art historical approach to color, see John Gage
1999.
44. For Marquand’s work with Peirce on a logical machine, see Marquand 1883b. It should be
noted here that this machine not only worked but has even been taken as an important object in
the development of computers.
45. Perhaps the most well-known statement about this divide is by Snow 1959. This divide was
very much being articulated within Marquand’s milieu, especially by writers like Wilhelm Dilthey
and  Wilhelm  Windelband.  Though  it  is  unknown  exactly  how  Marquand  thought  about  this
divide, it seems reasonable to assume that he would have downplayed it and advocated for a
more unified view of “scientific” research across the humanities, social, and physical sciences. 
46. Peirce (1992 [1877]: 111).
47. On  the  origins  of  Flinders  Petrie’s  sequence  dating  techniques,  see  Dower  1985.  For
Marquand’s interest and excitement about Petrie’s work in general, see Marquand (1891: 12-4).
Marquand was one of the founding editors of the American Journal of Archaeology and was thus
likely familiar with Flinders Petrie’s techniques from quite early on.
48. For example, see Richard MacNeish’s relative chronologies of pottery (MacNeish 1970).
49. Marquand (2016: 295).
50. Charles Sanders Peirce, Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, vol. 5: 172, 590.
51. For a discussion of Peirce’s theory of abduction and how it relates to his Pragmatism, see
Burks 1946. For a more extensive treatment of Peirce’s notion of abduction, see Fann 1970.
52. A good example of such an interpretation is Mieke Bal and Norman Bryson (1991: 174-208).
For a consideration of art history’s incomplete engagement with Peirce see, James Elkins (2003:
5-22).
53. Henri Zerner (1982: 279); Hans Belting 1983.
54. Art historians have long dedicated themselves to this type of positive theory building, though
perhaps because of early models like Marquand, it  has taken English-language art history an
especially  long  time  to  catch  up.  In  this  regard,  two  relatively  recent  books  are  especially
noteworthy, Summers 2003; Davis 2011.
ABSTRACTS
In this introduction I closely read Marquand’s arguments in “On Scientific Method in the Study of
Art” both in relation to their sources and in relation to Marquand’s own subsequent scholarship.
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My  thesis  is  that  Charles  Sanders  Peirce’s  writing  is  the  most  conspicuous  and  important
inspiration for the essay; however I also contend that Marquand’s handwritten corrections to the
surviving manuscript of the text reveal a struggle with Peirce’s ideas that can – especially in light
of  Marquand’s  later  writing  –  be  read  to  expose  an  ambivalent  or  potentially  even  critical
attitude  toward  central  aspects  of  Peirce’s  thought.  I  conclude  by  noting  that  Marquand’s
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